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Software Producers’ Choice on Compatibility with Hardware
Sang-Yong Tom Lee
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Software products do not provide consumption benefit unless a hardware product is installed in
advance. In the market with this software – hardware relationship, a software producer
sometimes finds that it is profitable to make its product compatible with only a certain
hardware product. This incompatibility decision is considered as a vertical foreclosure. The
conditions under which vertical merger and foreclosure occur in equilibrium are analyzed. We
find that the welfare reducing foreclosure arises in equilibrium even without the credible
commitment of foreclosure decision.
Key Words: Compatibility Decision, Hardware-Software, Base–Supplemental Goods,
Vertical Foreclosure
1. Introduction
Software products do not provide consumption benefits unless some other products are
purchased in advance and used in conjunction. For example, consumers need to have hardware
products. Some software products like operating system (OS) are also essential and
prerequisite to other application software products. In this complementary relationship, we
define ‘base good’ as one of the two complementary goods that must be purchased and
installed prior to use application software products. Examples are hardware and OS. We also
define ‘supplemental good’ as the other complementary good that provides consumption
benefit when only used in conjunction with a base good. Any application software is a
supplemental good. A base good may give consumption benefit without a specific
supplemental good but a supplemental good always requires a base good.
An important property of many goods in the base-supplemental relationship is that the base
good is typically much less substitutable than the supplemental good because of high switching
costs. For instance, a consumer can pick Netscape Navigator or Internet Explorer as a default
web-browser and switch from one to the other one easily. Changing computers from a PC (and
Windows operating system) to a Mackintosh is, however, more problematic. We analyze a
market with two complementary goods in ‘base-supplemental’ relation in this paper and the
canonical example is hardware-software products.
The studies on the markets with two related products have focused on the monopoly reasons
for vertical control. The issues in the studies are including the anti-competitive effects of
vertical mergers, the possibilities of vertical foreclosure, and the welfare effect of vertical
integration. While Chicago school argued that there is no monopoly reason for vertical
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integration1, many recent authors like Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (OSS) (1990), Choi and
Yi(1997) showed that anti-competitive vertical merger or vertical foreclosure can occur as an
equilibrium.
When they consider the vertically related industries, they focus on the upstream-downstream
relationship, so the upstream firms produce intermediate goods and the downstream firms
produce final goods with the upstream firms’ intermediate goods. Therefore, no consumers’
choices are directly involved in this vertical relationship. This paper, contrarily, considers a
vertically related industry where the firms’ products are sold directly to consumers. Therefore,
consumers choose both components of the complementary goods.
Many works of Economides (Economides and Salop(1992), Economides(1994), and
Economides(1997))are analyzing the market with two complementary goods. They are
characterized by bundling purchase of two simple complementary goods, like bolt and nut. So,
there is no consideration in purchasing timing or in difference of substitutability between base
goods and supplemental goods in their models. Church and Gandal(1997) assume a timing
structure where consumers purchase hardware first, then software. In this sense, this paper is
following their setting. However, they do not capture the fact that hardware is less
substitutable than software.
When a firm produces both hardware and software products, sometimes it makes its software
products incompatible against the rival firms’ hardware. This is called vertical foreclosure.
For example, Nintendo and Sony do not have compatibility to each other. In this paper, we
consider the possibility of vertical foreclosure and its welfare effect. We analyze the
conditions that make vertical foreclosure be an equilibrium outcome. We find that there is
more incentive for vertical foreclosure when the degree of substitutability is high and market
share of foreclosing product is small. We also find that even without the credible commitment
of foreclosure decision, the welfare reducing foreclosure may arise.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe the basic model in section 2. The equilibrium
outcomes of the model are explained in section 3, and the welfare effect of integration and
foreclosure are discussed in section 4. In section 5, we mention the possible extension of the
model followed by conclusion and summary.
2. Model
2.1. Firms
Two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) are producing base goods (hardware) B1 and B2, and two firms
(firm 3 and firm 4) are producing supplemental goods (software) S1 and S2 respectively. A base
good and a supplemental good are, of course, complementary. Base goods firms and
supplemental goods firms have constant marginal production cost, mcB and mcS, respectively.
All fixed costs are sunk.

1

see Tirole(1988) and Ordover, Saloner, and Salop(1990)
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Each pair of firms are under price competition. The price of base goods B1 and B2 are denoted
to be q1 and q2, and the supplemental goods S1 and S2 are denoted to be p1 and p2, respectively.
We also denote the market share of B1 to be ω and the market share of B2 to be 1-ω.
We are assuming that the compatibility decisions are on supplemental good firms (firm 3 and
firm 4). If either of two supplemental good firms makes its good compatible only with one of
the base goods, then that behavior is considered as a foreclosure against the other base good.
The compatibility structure will be one of the three cases; 1) full compatibility, 2) partial
foreclosure, and 3) parallel foreclosure. We also assume that it is costless to change the
compatibility structure and the ownership structure.
2.2. Consumers
There are N consumers in the market, and N is normalized to 1. We assume that a consumer
needs to have one unit of base good to consume supplemental goods. Consumers’ preferences
are identical. We denote the demand of S1 with base B1 and B2 to be S11 and S21 respectively
and the demand of S2 with base B1 and B2 to be S12 and S22.
If a consumer has base good Bi (i=1,2) and both S1 and S2 are compatible with Bi, then her
utility function is
1
2
2
(1)
U ( X , Bi , S i1 , S i 2 ) = X + h( Bi ) + αS i1 + αS i 2 − ( βS i1 + βS i 2 + 2γS i1 S i 2 )
2
where X is the outside good and h(B) is the stand-alone benefit of base good. B is defined over
non-negative integer with h(0)=0, h(1)>0, and h(1)≥h(k) for all integer k. Note that we assume
the utility function is separable in X, the outside good and the base good. We also assume that
all coefficients are positive, and β>γ.2 The budget constraint of consumers with base good Bi
is:
X + qi Bi + p1 S i1 + p 2 S i 2 = I ,
i = 1,2
(2)

Maximization of (1) subject to (2) yields demand equations:
S i1 = a − bp1 + cp 2 ,
S i 2 = a − bp 2 + cp1 ,
i = 1,2
where a ≡

α
β +γ

,b ≡

β
β −γ
2

2

,c ≡

γ
β −γ 2
2

(3)

. At the consumer’s optimal choice, the realized

consumer’s surplus with base good Bi* is

1
CS i = U ( X * , B * , S i*1 , S i*2 ) = I + h( Bi* ) − qi Bi* + ( βS i*12 + βS i*22 + 2γS i*1 S i*2 )
2
Note that h(B*)=h(1) is a constant.

(4)

If a consumer already has a durable base good before the maximization, then her consumption
benefit (CB) with that base good is

2 This can be interpreted as “an increase in the price of all differentiated goods reduces
the demand for each good.” This restriction is quite common in oligopoly models.
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1
CS i = U ( X * , B * , S i*1 , S i*2 ) = I + h( Bi* ) + ( βS i*12 + βS i*22 + 2γS i*1 S i*2 )
2

(5)

Now, if Bi and Sj are not compatible, then Sj does not give any consumption benefit to the
consumers with Bi, so the utility function will not include the terms with incompatible good Sj.
Therefore, when a consumer has Bi and only Si is compatible with it, her utility function and
budget constraint will be
1
2
Uˆ ( X , Bi , Sˆ ii ) = X + h( Bi ) + αSˆ ii − βS ii
(1)’
2
X + qi Bi + p1 Sˆii = I ,
i = 1,2
(2)’
We denote Ŝ i to be the supplemental good Si when Sj is not compatible with the base good Bi.
The demand function and the realized consumer’s surplus in this case are
Sˆ ii = d − epi ,
Sˆij = 0,
i≠ j
(3)’
where d≡α/β, and e≡1/β.3
1
CS i = Uˆ ( X * , B * , Sˆ ii* ) = I + h( Bi* ) − qi Bi* + βSˆ ii*2
(4)’
2
Again, if we drop the third term of the right hand side, then we have consumption benefit of a
consumer who has a base good ex ante:
1
CS i = Uˆ ( X * , B * , Sˆ ii* ) = I + h( Bi* ) + βSˆ ii*2
(5)’
2
Since equation (3) or (3)’ is the individual’s demand function and consumers are identical, we
can get the market demand function by simply multiplying (3) or (3)’ by the number of
consumers with that particular base good.
2.3. Setting of the game

We model the three-stage game. Before the beginning of the game, consumers already
purchased and installed the base goods, and the market shares are exogenously given. We
assume that the initial industrial structure is independent ownership with full compatibility. In
the first stage, observing the initial value of ω (we denote it to be ω0), firms decide the
compatibility and ownership structures. In the second stage, firm 1 and firm 2 set the prices of
base goods simultaneously, and consumers can switch their base goods. If a consumer chooses
to switch it, she needs to purchase a new base good, but if she decides to stay with the previous
base good, she pays nothing. Therefore, the price of the base good works as switching costs.
In the final stage, firm 3 and firm 4 set the price of supplemental goods simultaneously, and
consumers purchase them.
2.4. Three subgames
3 To

compare the profits and consumer surplus in the next chapter, it is very helpful to
a(b + c)
b2 − c2
express d and e in terms of a, b, and c as follows: d =
,e =
.
b
b
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The equilibrium outcomes of this game can be derived by backward induction. So, we start
with the final stage. Since the supplemental goods’ prices are not affected by the ownership
structure, we calculate the profits of firms under the three different compatibility structures.
2.4.1. Full compatibility
If firm 3 and firm 4 make their products compatible both with B1 and B2, then the objective
functions of firm 3 and firm 4 will be
π3 = p1 (ωS11+(1-ω)S21)
π4 = p2 (ωS12+(1-ω)S22)
By solving the first order conditions, the optimal prices, profits and consumption benefits are
obtained:
a
p1full = p 2full =
2b − c
a 2b
π 1full = π 2full =
(6)
(2b − c) 2
a 2b 2
CB1full = CB2full =
(b − c)(2b − c) 2
2.4.2. Partial foreclosure
When one of the two supplemental good firms (say firm 3) makes its good(S1) be compatible
with only one of the two base goods(say B1), so forecloses against B2, then the firms’ objective
functions will be
π3 = p1 (ωS11+(1-ω)S^21) = p1ωS11
π4 = p2 (ωS12+(1-ω)S^22)
The optimal prices and profits are
a (ωc 2 + 2b 2 − c 2 + bc)
a(2b + 2c − ωc)
,
p1part =
p 2part =
2
2
2
3ωc 2 + 4b 2 − 4c 2 )
b(3ωc + 4b − 4c )
ωa 2 (ωc 2 + 2b 2 − c 2 + bc) 2
a 2 (2b + 2c − ωc) 2 (b 2 − c 2 + ωc 2 )
part
π 3part =
,
π
=
4
b(3ωc 2 + 4b 4 − 4c 2 ) 2
b(3ωc 2 + 4b 2 − 4c 2 ) 2

(7)

CB1part = a2(8b5+4b4ωc+4b4c+16b3ωc2+b3ω2c2-15c2b3+5b2ω2c3+2b2ωc3-7b2c3
+
9bω2c4-16c4ωb+7c4b+3c5-6c5ω+3c5ω2) / 2b(b-c)(3ωc2+4b2-4c2)2
CB2part= a2(b+c)(2b2+ωbc+2ωc2-2c2)2 / b(b-c)(3ωc2+4b2-4c2)2
Note that prices are higher under partial foreclosure than under full compatibility, i.e., p2part>
p1part >pfuil. This is because firm 4 becomes, in a sense, a monopolist for the consumers with
B2 after the foreclosure. Higher p2 causes higher p1 because prices are strategic complements
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in the Bertrand game. Firm 4 will always be better off by the foreclosure of firm 3 against B2,
i.e., π4part>π4full, while we can not unambiguously determine whether or not firm 3 will be
better. Finally, CB1part > CB2part, and this is because consumers with B2 can not enjoy the
product diversity of supplemental goods.
2.4.3. Parallel foreclosure
If firm 4 also makes its product (S2) be compatible only with B2 under the partial foreclosure,
then it will be changed into the parallel foreclosure. The objective functions will be

π 3 = p1 (ωŜ11 + (1 - ω )Ŝ 21 ) = p1ωŜ11

π 4 = p 2 (ωŜ12 + (1 - ω )Ŝ 22 ) = p 2 (1 − ω )Ŝ 22
The optimal prices and profits are
a
2(b − c)
2
(1 − ω )a 2 (b + c)
ωa (b + c)
paral
paral
, π4
=
π3 =
(8)
4b(b − c)
4b(b − c)
a 2 (b + c)
paral
paral
CB1
= CB2
=
8b(b − c)
Under parallel foreclosure, prices get even higher than under partial foreclosure, because firm
3 and firm 4 are like two independent monopolists. However, we cannot unambiguously say
whether firm 3 and firm 4 are better off from partial foreclosure.
p1paral = p 2paral =

3. Equilibrium outcome

Now, we need to analyze the base good firms’ pricing rule. Since B1 and B2 are homogenous,
as long as both goods give the same consumption benefit, consumers have no incentive to
switch their base goods. Therefore, if the compatibility structure is full compatibility or
parallel foreclosure, nothing will happen in the second stage. Under partial compatibility,
however, the consumption benefits from B1 and B2 are different (CB1>CB2). If that difference
is larger than the price of B1, then consumers with base good B2 purchase B1 and switch their
base goods.
The lowest possible price of B1 is the marginal cost (mcB). Therefore, we can consider two
cases: 1) marginal cost is relatively low (mcB<CB1part-CB2part ), and 2) marginal cost is
relatively high (mcB≥CB1part-CB2part).
3.1. High switching cost case

When mcB ≥CB1part-CB2part, consumers always stay with their current base goods and base good
firms don’t get any additional profits in the second stage. This fact makes two notable points.
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First of all, the initial market share ω0 does not change till the end of the game. Second of all,
it is meaningless to consider the joint profits of base good firm and supplemental firm good.
Therefore, ownership structure is not a concern in this case. We analyze the equilibrium
outcome of compatibility structure, which is decided by two supplemental good firms.
Firm 3 will make its product be compatible only with B1, if π3part>π3full. Otherwise, it will make
its good be compatible with both B1 and B2. From (6) and (7), we can compare the profits of
two cases.
π3part>π3full

iff

4ω 2 c5b −ω 2 c 6 − 4ω 2 c 4b2 −16ωc 2b 4 +17ωc 4b2 +ωc 6 + 8ωc3b3 − 6ωc5b −16c 4b 2 + 32c 2b4 −16b6 > 0

To understand the economic meaning of this inequality, we divide above inequality by b6.
Then we have
(9)
4ω2η5 −ω2η6 − 4ω2η4 −16ωη2 +17ωη4 +ωη6 + 8ωη3 − 6ωη5 −16η4 + 32η2 −16 > 0
where η≡c/b. Note that η is the degree of substitutability of two supplemental goods, and since
b>c≥0, η is between zero and one.(η∈[0,1)) If η is equal to zero, two supplemental goods are
independent, and if η is near 1, then two goods are close substitutes.
The inequality (9) cannot be determined unambiguously. It may be true with some
combinations of ω and η. Since ω∈[0,1] and η∈[0,1), we can indicate the combinations of ω
and η to make (8) true in <figure 1>. In <figure 1>, the horizontal axis is ω and the vertical axis
is η. There is a downward sloping curve which starts at (0, 1) and ends at around (1, .9). The
area above that curve indicates the combinations of ω and η to hold the inequality (8). In other
words, if (ω, η) is in that area, firm 3 will choose to foreclose against B2 and make its product
be compatible only with B1. If (ω, η) is below that curve, then firm 3 will make S1 be
compatible with both B1 and B2.4
We observe that the area for the partial foreclosure is with high η, the degree of substitutability.
One can also see that area gets wider as ω, the market share of B1 bigger. Therefore, we say
that there are more incentives for partial foreclosure with higher degree of substitutability and
with bigger market share of B1.
What is the intuition behind this story? In other words, what is the source of the incentives for
the foreclosure. If firm 3 forecloses against B2, then it completely loses the customers with B2.
We call this abandon effect. However, once it forecloses, firm 4 becomes a monopolist for the
consumers with B2, and it has an incentive to raise the price of S2. Since p1 and p2 are strategic
complements, firm 3's best response to the firm 4's behavior is to raise p1, but lower than p2.
(recall that p2part> p1part >pfull). If S1 and S2 are close substitutes, consumers with base good B1
In fact, we only need to look at the area for ω ∈[1/2, 1]. Because a supplemental
firm , if it has choice, forecloses not against the base good with larger market share but against
smaller market share.
4
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are willing to buy more S1 than S2. We call this substitution effect. The latter effect will
dominate the former effect when S1 and S2 are close substitutes or when the market share of B1
is large.
Now, under the partial foreclosure structure, we need to check whether firm 4 has an incentive
to foreclose against B1. This is called counter foreclosure. Firm 4 will do so if π4paral > π4part.
By the same way as we did above, we get
π4paral > π4part
iff
2 5
2 4
5
4
− 5ω η −13ω η +13ωη + 37ωη − 4ωη3 − 28ωη2 − 8η5 − 24η4 + 8η3 + 40η2 −16 > 0

(10)

The combinations of (ω,η) to hold this inequality are indicated in <figure 1>. They are the area
above the upward sloping curve which starts at about (0, 0.74) and ends at (1, 0).
Again, as the degree of substitutability is higher and the market share of B2, (1-ω) is bigger,
counter foreclosure is more likely to occur. By foreclosing, firm 4 will lose all the sales to the
consumers with base good B1. However, that amount of sales is small when ω is small or when
the degree of substitutability is high.
From the two inequalities (9) and (10), we can find the equilibrium compatibility structure
under given combination of market share and degree of substitutability. If the combinations of
(ω,η) are below the downward sloping curve, then the equilibrium compatibility structure will
be full compatibility. If the combinations of (ω,η) are above the downward sloping curve but
below the upward sloping curve, then partial foreclosure will be the equilibrium outcome. If
combinations of (ω,η) are above both curves, then parallel foreclosure is the equilibrium
outcome.
<Proposition 1> The closer substitutes are the two supplemental goods, the more
incentives does a firm have for foreclosure against one base good. The equilibrium
compatibility structure depends on the given combinations of market share and degree
of substitutability of two supplemental goods as indicated in <Figure 1>

The downward sloping curve represents (9) and the upward sloping curve represents (10). The
curves are drawn in GAUSS by numerically changing the combination value of (ω, η). No
further proof is required in this proposition, but we can look at some specific values to see
whether it works. For example, if ω=0, then the left hand side of (9) becomes –16(η2-1)2 < 0.
Therefore, the equilibrium structure is full compatibility. If ω=1, then the left hand side of (9)
becomes 2η3+3η2-4, which is positive when η is between 0.9 and 1. In this manner, we
construct the downward slopping curve in <Figure 1>
3.2. Low switching cost case

In the high switching cost case, π1 and π2 are always zero, because no consumers are buing the
additional base good. However, in the low switching cost case, a consumer may purchase a
new base good if the consumption benefits from the two base goods are different because a
base good price may be lower than the consumption benefits difference. Recall two
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consumption benefits are different only under partial compatibility.
Therefore, if
mcB<CB1part-CB2part, firm 1 charges the price of B1 to be slightly lower than the difference, and
makes consumers with B2 switch to B1. In this case, q1* = CB1part-CB2part-ε, where ε is small
enough positive number. Hence, π1part = (1-ω)(CB1part-CB2part-ε-mcB) and π2part = 0, because
1-ω portion of consumers purchase B1 at price q1*.
However, firm 1 does not have the compatibility choice by itself, so firm 3 should be involved
in that structural change. Firm 3 may agree to make S1 be compatible only with B1 if the joint
profit of firm 1 and firm 3 under partial foreclosure is larger than firm 3's profit under full
compatibility, even though its own profit under partial foreclosure is not larger. Therefore, by
explicitly considering the ownership structure with compatibility structure, we may have a
different equilibrium outcome. Firm 1 and firm 3 will integrate and foreclose against B2, if
π1part + π3part(ω=1) > π3full(ω=ω0).

(11)

It is easy to see that there is stronger incentive in the low switching cost case than in the high
switching cost case. In fact, the above inequality holds everywhere. This is because
π3part(ω=1) = π3full(ω=ω0) and π1part >0. Hence, in low switching cost case, partial integration
and foreclosure always occur.
Now, we consider the possibility of counter foreclosure. If firm 4 merges with firm 2 and
forecloses against B1, then industrial structure will go back to symmetric structure. Since
CS1paral = CS2paral, consumers would not change from the previous choice of the base goods and
q1= q2=π1=π2=0. Therefore, if firm 4's profit π4paral with initial market share ω0 is greater than
π4part with ω=1, then counter merger and counter foreclosure will occur.
π4paral (ω=ω0) > π4part (ω=1)

iff

− ωη3 + 3ωη2 − 4ω + η 3 − 3η 2 + 4η > 0 (12)

This inequality is true for the area above the curve in <Figure 2>, which looks like a 45-degree
line. Therefore, we can conclude that if (ω, η) is above the curve in <Figure 2>, then parallel
integration and foreclosure is the equilibrium outcome, and if (ω, η) is below that curve, then
partial integration and foreclosure is the equilibrium outcome. The intuition for the counter
foreclosure is the same as in the high switching cost case.
<Proposition 2> If (ω, η) is above the curve in <Figure 2>, then parallel integration and
foreclosure will be the equilibrium outcome and if (ω, η) is below that curve, then partial
integration and foreclosure will be the equilibrium outcome. In the partial integration
outcome, however, firm 1 will sweep all the consumers and the market share will be
changed into ω=1. The optimal price of B1 in this case is CS1part-CS2part- ε .

Proof: First, we need to show that at least partial foreclosure will always occur, i.e., π1part+
π3part
(ω=1)
π3full
(ω=ω0)>0.
Since
π1part+
π3part
(ω=1)
π3full
a2 (1− ω)(2b2 + bc + ωc2 − c2 )2
(ω=ω0)=
, and it is always positive, at least partial foreclosure
2b(4b2 + 3ωc2 − 4c2 )2
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occurs. Now, parallel foreclosure arises in equilibrium when the inequality (12) holds. The
downward sloping curve is drawn in GAUSS by numerically changing the combination value
of (ω, η). When the combination of (ω, η) is in the area above this curve, then the inequality
(12) is true and the equilibrium structure is parallel foreclosure. Otherwise, partial foreclosure
is the equilibrium ownership structure. <Q.E.D.>
4. Welfare Effects

The social welfare is defined as the sum of the profits of firms and consumers’ surplus. By
comparing social welfare in three cases, we can conclude that Welfarefull > Welfarepart >
Welfareparal. It is interesting to note that firm 2 and firm 4 are not hurt by partial foreclosure at
all. Firm 4 is even better off by it. All burdens of welfare loss are on consumers.
<Proposition 3> Integration and foreclosure causes welfare loss to the society. Welfare is
the best under full compatibility, and the worst under the parallel foreclosure. Partial
foreclosure is between the two.

proof : We need to show 1) Welfarefull - Welfarepart > 0, and 2) Welfarepart - Welfareparal > 0.
1) sign[Welfarefull - Welfarepart] = sign [20η 4(1-η )ω 2 + 5η 6 ω 2 +(60η 2-44η 3-43η 4+46η5
-15 η6)ω + 48-6η +12η 6+16η 4-76η 2+40η 3-24η 5]. Let the term in parenthesis of the right
hand side be Θ(ω ,η). Since Θ is a quadratic function where ω is between 0 and 1, Θ(ω ,η) is
positive if Θ(0,η )>0, Θ(1 ,η)>0, and Θ(ωm,η) >0, where ωm is the argument of min Θ(ω ,η).
However, since ωm is greater than 1 and we don’t need to check the sign of Θ(ω m,η). We see
that the sign [Θ(ω ,η)] = sign [-3η 3+9η 2-16η+12]. The derivative of -3η 3+9η 2-16η +12
with respect to η is -9η 2+18η -16, which is always negative when 0<η < 1. This means it is
monotonically decreasing function of η between 0 and 1. Since -3η 3+9η 2-16η +12 = 2 when
η =1, the sign of -3η3+9η 2-16η +12 is positive. By the same procedure, we see that the sign
[Θ(1, η )] = sign [-2η 3+2η2-5η +6] is positive. Therefore, Welfarefull - Welfarepart > 0.
2) sign [Welfarepart - Welfareparal ] = sign [20η 4(1-η )ω 2 + (53η 5-51η 4-44η 3+60η2)ω 36η5+28η4+52η3-76η 2-16η +48]. Let the term in the parenthesis of the right hand side be
Ξ(ω , η). Since Ξ is a quadratic function of ω which is between 0 and 1, Ξ(ω ,η ) is positive if
(0, η)>0, (1, η)>0, and (ω m, η)>0, where ω m is the argument of min (ω , η). However, since
ωm is greater than 1, we do not need to check the sign of Ξ(ω m, η). It is easy to see that sign [Ξ
(0, η)] = sign [9η2-16η +12] >0. Sign [Ξ(1, η)] is equal to sign [-3η 3+9η 2-16η +12], which
we already show the positive sign in 1). Therefore, Welfarepart - Welfareparal > 0. (Q.E.D.)
In our setting, we find two remarkable points that depart from OSS (1990) and other vertical
foreclosure literatures. First, contrary to other ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’ results, partial
foreclosure (and integration) does not hurt the rival firm’s profit even though it reduces social
welfare. Second, even without the ability of commitment, the welfare reducing foreclosure
may arise. We need to look at the details of the second point.
We’ve showed that partial foreclosure always occurs in the low switching cost case. When
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firm 1 and firm 3 announce the merger and foreclosure decision in the first stage, then
consumers with base good B2 will purchase base good B1 in the second stage. However,
suppose some consumers with B2 do not switch to B1 in the second stage for some reason.
Then, in the final stage, firm 3 may have an incentive to renege on its foreclosure commitment
and supply S1 to these consumers. Knowing this, consumers may not purchase and switch to
B1.
This commitment problem has been a big issue of vertical foreclosure literatures since
OSS(1990).5 They show that anticompetitive vertical integration can arise in equilibrium if the
vertically integrated firm can commit not to sell its input to the unintegrated downstream firm.
It has been argued that OSS’s result breaks down if the vertically integrated firm cannot make
the credible commitment because the integrated firm has a strong incentive to renege on its
price commitment and undercut the unintegrated rival’s price.
If we assume that the firms cannot commit to foreclose against the unintegrated rival firm, then
our equilibrium ownership structure in Figure 2.2 is no longer valid. However, if the initial
market share and the degree of substitutability are in the partial foreclosure area of the Figure
2.1, then without the ability of commitment, firm 3 forecloses against B2 anyway. If the initial
market share and the degree of substitutability are not in this area, then there is no incentive for
firm 3 to foreclose. Therefore, we can say that even without credible commitment, welfare
reducing foreclosure may happen if the market share of foreclosing product is small and the
degree of substitutability is high.
5. Conclusion

We consider a market with two complementary goods, a ‘base good’(hardware) and a
‘supplemental’ good (software). With the assumption that there are two base good firms and
two supplemental good firms, we analyze the conditions that make vertical integration and
incompatibility decision equilibrium outcomes. Incompatibility decision can be considered as
a vertical foreclosure. We find that there are more incentives for partial foreclosure when the
degree of substitutability of two competing supplemental goods (software products) is high and
market share of foreclosing product is small. We also find that even without a credible
commitment of foreclosure decision, the welfare reducing foreclosure may arise.
Our results may not be sensitive to the restriction on a consumer’s initial purchase of a base
good. This needs to be examined in a dynamic game that allows a certain portion of consumers
repurchase base goods when their durabilities wear out. In this case, we need to consider the
firm’s present value of future profits. The equilibrium ownership structures may be different.
This remains as an area for future study

5

If we do not want to worry about the commitment problem, then as Church and
Gandal (1997) do, we can assume that the compatibility choice is not reversible because it is
too costly, or that a firm has an incentive to build its ‘reputation’ over time.
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<Figure 1> Equilibrium Outcome under High Switching Cost

488

n
parallel foreclosure

partial foreclosure

Initial w

<Figure 2> Equilibrium Outcome under Low Switching Cost
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